THE CONFLICT IN VIETNAM

 By

Colin F JONES

The world had never before focused so widely upon a 'limited' military conflict such as was waged in South Vietnam, probably due to its accessibility to the mass media. People who were not directly involved in the war became aware of the stark realities of battlefield horror as they watched selected segments on their television sets.

 The Media concerned themselves mostly with film of the 'innocent victims' of war, of the dead and dying, and many stories and articles which followed, concentrated on the brave efforts of in field reporters risking their lives to reveal the terrible repercussions of military conflict, on civilians.

 Certain segments had great impact on the viewer. One in particular shown on Television was the execution of an unarmed bound Viet Cong prisoner who was shot through the head by South Vietnamese Police Chief, Brigadier General Nguyen Ngog Loan. This helped to stimulate the belief that the US was supporting a corrupt government. Little was mentioned about the fact that the prisoner, a Viet Cong Officer, had previously ordered the murder of one of Loans most trusted friends and his entire family, both women and children.

The basis of Communism from a military point of view is prolonged warfare. Mao's reasoning, that countries with legislative systems cannot survive a war of attrition, such as is conducted by a Guerrilla army, either financially or psychologically, inspired leaders of the Viet Cong to commit massive human and material resources to military conflict, which were in fact sustained despite the correspondingly massive losses in Vietnam.

Despite that entire Western nations knew about Guerrilla type warfare, in particular the USA, little had been done to prepare military forces for this type of warfare. This either indicated a serious misunderstanding of the threat of Communism or a desired intention to refrain from committing troops directly to such operations. The conflict in South Vietnam demanded massive commitment of military forces, but not in a protective role, for the protective role is a defensive one.  The Viet Cong had no such commitments, their main role being one of offence.

  A massive commitment to defence requires twice as many men to wage war and provides increased targets for the enemy. Despite the superior weaponry and dominant control of the skies over Vietnam, the Americans were not equipped to handle the type of warfare in which they were engaged.  Studies of the conflict in Borneo, undertaken by British forces, reveals that the British were better prepared, and in a forgotten war - which they won - set standards for western armies to follow in Guerrilla type conflicts.

But the Americans failed to acquire, or act upon the same knowledge in the Vietnam conflict, even though such valuable training manuals were available through the British experience.

 President John Kennedy recognized the nations defence policies to an extent by increasing conventional weapons. He ordered US Military advisors to Vietnam in 1961-62, when the threat to Thailand and South Vietnam was indicated.  He also sent advisors to Laos. His government was most critical of the treatment handed out to the Buddhists by Ngo Dinh Diem’s government.  Kennedy in fact established many indicators that it was not his intention to commit American troops to the defense of what was a corrupt regime.

 Australian soldiers had served in Malaysia and Borneo with the British and to an extent were more suitably prepared for the Vietnam conflict, though of course, they were in much less numbers and were not involved in the major conflicts along the Cambodian border, as were the Americans.

MAO TSE-TUNG

 The Russian Bolsheviks under Lenin and Trotsky first conceived the role of the Guerrilla. However it was Mao Tse-tung who first applied a systemized doctrine of offensive Guerrilla strategy.  In this type of strategy, the Guerrilla forces reach far beyond the original defensive functions of their conception.  Mao had devoted his life to the evolution of a military doctrine that would enable inferior military forces of an unindustrialized nation, to establish an aggressive, expansionist, and political strategy, despite opposition from materially superior forces of other nations. Mao was born in 1893 of Hunanese peasant stock and was trained in the Chinese classics, later acquiring a modern education.  He traveled widely as a young man, particularly in central China. He was one of the founders of the Chinese communist party and he organized peasant and industrial unions sponsored by the Kuomintang in the 1920's.

 During 1924-26 he directed the peasant section of the party. When the Kuomintang and Communists split in 1927 he led the disastrous autumn crop uprising in Hunan province and was forced out of the central committee of the party.  From then until 1931 Mao, Chu, Tch   and others worked in the Chinese hinterlands establishing rural soviets and building the Red Army. In 1931 he was elected Chairman of the Soviet Republic of China.

 After withstanding many military campaigns launched by Chiang Kai Shek, Mao led the Red army on a long march, (1934-35), 6000 miles from Kiangsi province, north to Yenan in Shensi province.  Mao continued the civil war with Chiang Kai Shek and the Kuomintang despite fighting the Japanese during the second Chino-Japanese war. In 1949 the communists had taken over almost all of mainland China and Mao was made Chairman of the central government council of the newly established Peoples Republic of China. In 1954 he was re-elected to this position of power. He became the leading communist figure in the world, particularly after the death of Stalin in 1953. One of its most prominent theoreticians, his ideas on active revolutionary struggle and guerrilla warfare were particularly influential.

 Liu Shao-Chi replaced Mao as Chairman of the government council in 1959, but Mao retained his chairmanship of the communist party thus remaining the chief policy planner of the government.

HO CHI MINH 

 Ho Chi Minh was born in 1890 and was the president of the  Republic of North  Vietnam.  He fled his native Annam when he was 19 and went to France   where he helped to found the French communist party. From 1925 to 1927 he lived in the USSR. He subsequently became a Kuomintang leader in Shanghai, China and founded the communist party in Vietnam in 1930.

  Between 1930 and 1945 he returned to Indo-China and organised the   Vietnamese independent movement,  (Viet Minh) and rallied a Guerrilla army, which fought the Japanese in World War II.  In September 1945 he proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam, but late in 1946 differences with the French led to open warfare, which lasted to the summer of 1954, culminating in the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu. The rigorously disciplined Viet Minh organisation was a striking contrast to the  disunity in Vietnam. After the Geneva conference in 1954, which established the independence of North Vietnam Ho Chi Minh, became the first President.

FRENCH OCCUPATION 

In 1940 French Indo-China had remained loyal to Vichy France allowing  the Japanese to occupy the country without being  affronted with  resistance. Five years later, the Japanese treacherously massacred the unsuspecting French forces, when allied forces neared the Indo-China borders.

The various nationalistic groups of Indo-China, (encouraged by loss of  French prestige in World War 2) campaigned for some form of self government, (1946) causing the French to respond with a bombardment from a naval Cruiser on Hanoi to crush the rioting.

This action stimulated Ho Chi Minh to lead his nationalist and Communist followers into the hills to begin the  Vietnam war. Vo Nguyen Giap a former provincial History teacher who's wife had died in a French prison in 1940,  was the leader of the  communist forces. He would ultimately command the North Vietnamese Army in it's war against the USA.

The war was a Guerrilla war mounted against the French Colonial Regular Army. Locally recruited Asian Troops fought alongside French volunteers and the Moroccan, Algerian and Senegalese soldiers of the old Colonial regiments. The  newly-created Foreign Legion parachute battalion (1st BEP) and the BCP (Colonial Parachute Battalion) were organized as a 'Fire Brigade' designed and used to react to the offensives launched by the Viet Minh.

It was evident by 1950 that the prospects of victory for the French had diminished considerably. French settlers had undermined early attempts to negotiate and due to the Communist victory in China the Viet Minh had a safe base from which to operate. Guerrilla type conflict was soon abandoned for conventional warfare with highly trained Divisions of Viet Minh  moving into action supported by massed Artillery.

In rear guard action at Cao Bang close to the Chinese frontier, the BEP were almost entirely wiped out. In 1954 this Battalion would be destroyed again at Dien Bien Phu. The war, in fact, would cost the Foreign Legion some 10,000 casualties. By 1950 the forces of Ho Chi Minh numbered well over 100,000 regular troops organized into divisions with full  Artillery and Mortar  support.  Some 250,000 Guerrillas posed as farmers, working in the fields by day and continually harassing the French forces at night.  A steady flow of weapons and ammunition from China kept them armed.

The guerrilla type war, small scale attacks, sniping and ambushing, changed dramatically in  September of 1950 as some 30  Battalions of Viet Minh regulars were deployed north of the Red River for a concentrated  attack upon the frontier posts. Each post was overrun or evacuated,  one after another; garrisons were overwhelmed by sheer numbers. Relief columns were ambushed, news only eventually reaching Hanoi as survivors staggered from the jungle with their pitiful tales of slaughter. The French did not have much air support, and what they had was hopelessly inadequate. Helicopters were very few,  and lacked  the range to support most of the isolated positions.

French paratroops jumped from WW-2 German Ju-52's, although the Douglas B-26, with heavy machine guns and bombs did supply good support for the ground troops. A few F-8F Bearcat fighter bombers used High Explosive and Napalm, and occasionally in major conflicts Douglas B-26 Invaders were used. The problem was though, that the Viet Minh positions could seldom be found.

Armoured vehicles, both tracked and wheeled proved inadequate, susceptible to ambush. The Viet Minh were expert at camouflage and were rapidly learning the art of Motor Transport Ambush. Aerial reconnaissance rarely spotted the massive ambushes set up along  the highways. Anti-tank weapons  would be dug in to 'box  off' the convoys by knocking out vehicles at each end of  the  column. The losses were horrific and great.

DIEN BIEN PHU   

 The  French  forces occupied the remote valley of Dien Bien Phu  in the Winter of 1953. They were there to relieve the pressure from the Red River area by establishing a base from which ground troops could penetrate deep into Viet Minh occupied territory.

On  Hill Beatrice on 13th March 1954 the 13th Demi-Brigade,  Legion Trainee,  was destroyed by concentrated Viet Minh Artillery fire, and under the glow of hundreds of flares the Viet Minh troops poured in through the gaps blasted in the perimeter wire to overrun the position. 556 French Foreign Legion soldiers were casualties out of a Battalion of 750.

The  5th  BPVN  (Vietnamese Paratroopers) under the  leadership  of Major Andre Outsell jumped from waves of transport aircraft to  join the  troops on the ground landing on the original drop  zones. Just prior  to this the last of the aircraft two F-8F Bearcats made their escape from the battered airfield. In  pouring rain the paratroopers struggled 10 miles up the valley south of the embattled defences under constant harassment, digging in as best they could.

The  northernmost outpost 'Gabrielle' situated two miles above the airstrip  and occupied by the 5/7th Algerian Rifles was so vulnerable that it was the subject of jokes. It was, in fact, the size and the dimensions  of  a  50-per cent zone of 105-mm  Howitzers  firing  at medium range.

The  barrage began on March 14,  followed by an assault, by eight Battalions.  The  Algerians  fought bravely,  counter attacking  and winning  back ground earlier lost to the Viet Minh.  The attack  was checked by early afternoon by the French Artillery leaving piles  of bodies everywhere.

An hour later the Viet Minh returned firing 75-mm recoilless rifles, knocking  out  the northern machine gun bunker and slowly breaking through to overrun the position. Small pockets of  Algerians and a Legion mortar company fought on, but with the collapse of the 5th BPVN's counter attack, they began to surrender on 15th March.

The  5th  BPVN  were new to the area and with three M24 tanks in support had to follow the Legionaries. The tanks drove blindly under heavy shell fire through the night. They had little chance caught in withering crossfire and although many Vietnamese fled the Legionnaires stood and fought. The French had lost 1,000 men in a single night.

The following Viet Minh assaults failed to make any major  gains, but the defeats of Beatrice and Gabrielle set a pattern for the rest of the battle.

The  perimeter gradually began to shrink,  the Viet Minh digging in each night as they continued to advance. The  defending  French troops launched many raids attempting to capture a trench for a period of time to allow them to squash it with one of the remaining tanks. They crept out and set mines and  booby traps, but the Artillery of the  Viet Minh would continue to pound and another cluster of bunkers would be taken over by more assaults. Counter attacks were mounted to regain vital positions.

By early April the attacking Viet Minh had suffered 10,000 casualties, and the battle seemed to pause in equilibrium. The battle along route 41 to the north-east, and that above Dien Bien Phu shortened the pause. The French had failed, miscalculated their misconception that their air force could bomb the Viet Minh supply columns into submission and the flow of artillery and ammunitions were not ceased at any point in time.

The French aircraft above the base were subjected to continual automatic small arms fire, artillery fire, illuminating  shells, Bangalore torpedoes and searchlights. It was difficult for them to fly at only 300 meters at night and under such  harassment. During April eight planes were shot down and 47 damaged. On 26th April two B-26 Bombers were shot down flying at 10,000 feet; heavier guns had arrived along with Chinese advisors.

The  breakdown of aerial resupply was disastrous, poisoning relations between the Garrison and the air force. Only 23 of the 60 C-119 aircraft loads expected, arrived and three of them dropped their loads on the communist side during the final two days. Most of the troops had but one days supply of food left.

The failure of the air force to deliver spelt doom for those on the ground. They were not only short of food, but also of ammunition and water. Many units had been cut off from the only water-purifier, the local supply offering little else other than disease, certainly instant dysentery.

The greatest tragedy, was the horror of the wounded crammed  into every space available in the underground  hospital. The monsoon rains were beginning to flood the valley and medical supplies were in short supply. Maggots infested their wounds. Small units counter attacked to retrieve medical supplies dropped among  the communists, frantic affairs resulting in many deaths and many heroic retrievals of the vital supplies.

The options to use B-29 Super fortresses to carpet bomb the attacking Viet  Minh, and even to drop atomic bombs were rejected by the Americans because they did not want to become  entangled in the ground war. The Viet Minh due to a batch of aerial photos dropped among them from the air knew every inch of the Garrison position. Individual positions fought on as best they could, a few escaping into the jungle. 'Isabelle' held on until night from where a few hundred soldiers escaped.

French aircraft were allowed into Dien Bien Phu to evacuate a  few of the wounded in exchange for no more attacks  upon route 41, allowing the massive 500,000 strong concentration of Viet Minh to march to a new front line near Hanoi without harassment.

Of the 16,500 French soldiers who fought at Dien Bien Phu only 3,000 survived. 3,000 men were killed in action, but 10,000 died in the hands of the Viet Minh on death marches to distant POW camps, and in those camps in the last three months of the war.

French Indo China ceased to exist in July, and became Vietnam divided into North and South.

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